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Agricultural Trade Symposium
The WTO and America's Agricultural
Trade Agenda
Ambassador Peter Scher*
The United States is committed to further reform of world
agricultural trading rules and we are prepared to negotiate. In
contrast to the preparatory phase for the Uruguay Round, the
Uruguay Round's "built-in agenda" scheduled negotiations in
agriculture and services to begin in 2000. While a new WTO
Round was not launched at the Ministerial Conference in Seattle, we remain committed to using the built-in agenda's mandated start and any other opportunity to achieve our own
interest in opening new markets and strengthening guarantees
of fairness for America's farm and ranch families, and also to
ensure for the world a reliable supply of food at market prices.
We have therefore set ambitious goals, in areas ranging
from tariffs to export subsidies and treatment of biotechnology
products. This article will review these goals; the process by
which we have set our objectives; and our strategy, in particular
our work internationally, to build consensus on achieving them.
I.

AGRICULTURAL TRADE GOALS

American farmers are the most competitive and technically
advanced in the world, producing far more than we can ever eat.
As we have been reminded with the Asian financial crisis, trade
liberalization is not a guarantee against market fluctuations.
And as every farmer knows, trade liberalization does not guarantee good weather or high prices. To guard against these fluctuations, we must retain the capacity to provide a farm safety
net.
But the safety net is not enough. Trade liberalization creates the opportunities that our farmers and ranchers need for
* Head Agricultural Negotiator, Office of the United States Trade
Representative.
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growth. We must have the ability to export to the 96 percent of
humanity that lives beyond our borders. In fact, with one in
three American farm acres now producing for foreign markets,
we must export to remain profitable at home.
These realities are the foundation of our agricultural trade
policy. We have sought to:
* reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade;
* ensure that sanitary and phytosanitary standards are
based on science;
* promote fair trade by reducing foreign export subsidies
and trade-distorting domestic supports;
* ensure greater transparency and fairness in state trading; and
* help guarantee that farmers and ranchers can use safe
modern technologies, in particular biotechnology, without fear of trade discrimination.
II. URUGUAY ROUND ACHIEVEMENTS
We have pursued these goals in negotiations with all of our
major bilateral trading partners in a wide range of commodities
and in the regional initiatives we have opened in the Western
Hemisphere, Asia, Europe and Africa. At the heart of our work,
however, is the construction of a world trading system that
opens markets for farmers and ranchers; reduces unfair trade
practices; ensures that our trading partners do not use unscientific sanitary and phytosanitary measures to block American
goods, while ensuring that consumers in the United States and
around the world have the highest possible standards of food
safety; and gives us strong and credible means of settling
disputes.
The completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 marked the
first major step toward such a trading system. Under the Uruguay Round's Agreements on Agriculture and the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), we lowered tariffs
and are on track to eliminate most quantitative restrictions. We
reduced trade-distorting subsidies. We ensured that all WTO
members -

110 at the time, 135 today -

would use science-

based sanitary and phytosanitary measures to protect human,
animal and plant health rather than to bar imports. And we
created a strong dispute settlement system, which we have now
used thirteen times in the past four years to enforce the Agriculture and SPS Agreements, on issues ranging from fruit sales to
Japan, to pork in the Philippines, to dairy in Canada, and of
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course the still unresolved banana and beef hormone cases with
the European Union.
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the losing party in a trade dispute could block the adoption of the dispute panel report. Under
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, however, panel rulings
are binding, which means the WTO rules are enforceable. The
result is a greater willingness of countries to bring cases forward, a process which clarifies the rules and improves compliance. Knowing that panel decisions are binding, countries may
also be more likely to settle early, as happened in the Philippines pork case.
Two examples serve to illustrate the important benefits to
U.S. agriculture. Japan required tests of each variety of certain
fruits for pests, which the WTO ruled had no scientific basis.
The case established a valuable precedent that will be useful in
future challenges against thinly veiled protectionist measures
directed at our agricultural exports. Japan's compliance with
the WTO rulings will help our growers export more than $50
million a year of apples and other products to Japan.
In the Canada dairy case, the United States complained
that Canadian government subsidies for exports of dairy products are inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture. In addition to the specific ruling against Canada's subsidies, which
will reduce unfair export competition in dairy products, the
panel has usefully clarified the rules on agricultural export subsidies in a way that makes circumvention of the rules more
difficult.
The Uruguay Round has done a great deal to create a foundation of commitments to open markets, fair trade, respect for
science and an enforceable rule of law. But while this is a very
strong beginning, we are very far from done.
III.

DOMESTIC CONSULTATIONS

In the next decade, we can and should go well beyond the
achievements of the 1990s in aggressive reform of agricultural
trade. Wherever and whenever we can, we will use our opportunities to make trade more open for our farmers and ranchers;
encourage the most advanced and environmentally friendly agricultural technologies; and ultimately to increase the world's
food security.
Over the past 18 months, we have pursued a methodical
strategy which has moved us, step by step, towards these objectives. This began with our successful effort at the May 1998
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WTO Ministerial to renew the formal commitment by WTO
members to continue the agricultural reform process as called
for in the Uruguay Round and ensure that implementation of
existing agreements would receive priority attention.
We then opened a long series of consultations with Congress, agricultural producer and commodity groups and others
interested in the Round to seek advice on the goals and priorities we should set. This included publishing notices in the Federal Register seeking public comment on agricultural and other
policy goals.
We also held a series of Listening Sessions with the Department of Agriculture focusing specifically on agriculture this
June and July. In these sessions, senior USTR officials and agricultural negotiators visited Indianapolis, Indiana; Des Moines,
Iowa; Winter Haven, Florida; St. Paul, Minnesota; Memphis,
Tennessee; Austin, Texas; Sacramento, California; Richland,
Washington; Kearney, Nebraska; Newark, Delaware; Burlington, Vermont; and Bozeman, Montana to hear directly from
farmers, ranchers and others on the specific issues and commodities they felt should be our top negotiating priorities.
IV. U.S. TRADE NEGOTIATING GOALS
FOR AGRICULTURE
Having completed these sessions, we then developed a set of
specific proposals which together form an ambitious agenda for
agricultural negotiations. They will address the major concerns
raised in our consultations, including worldwide tariff disparities; reform of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy, which is
the world's largest single distortion of agricultural trade; the reduction in market transparency and competition created by
state trading monopolies; and ensuring fair treatment for trade
in biotechnology.
We tabled these proposals in August at the WTO in Geneva,
proposing that agricultural negotiations:
* Completely eliminate, and prohibit for the future, all remaining export subsidies as defined in the Agreement on
Agriculture;
* Substantially reduce trade-distorting supports and
strengthen rules that ensure all production-related support
is subject to discipline, while preserving criteria-based
"green box" policies that support agriculture while minimizing distortion to trade;
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Lower tariff rates and bind them, including but not limited
to zero/zero initiatives;
* Improve administration of tariff-rate-quotas;
* Strengthen disciplines on the operation of state trading
enterprises;
* Improve market access through a variety of means to the
benefit of least-developed Members by all other WTO Members; and
* Address disciplines to ensure that trade in agricultural biotechnology products is based on transparent, predictable and
timely processes.
We have requested a number of studies from the U.S. International Trade Commission on the barriers that confront U.S.
agriculture around the globe. In addition, agriculture is included in the request made to the ITC for advice on market access negotiations. Normally, this advice (which is required by
statute) would be requested once negotiations are launched. We
determined that in order to be ready, we should have the advice
in hand before negotiations begin.
*

V. BUILDING INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS
At the same time, we are working to build international consensus on our goals. The process includes these two elements:
creating the broadest possible coalitions in support of our specific goals in agriculture; and setting concrete precedents for our
goals in the negotiations through our regional trade initiatives
and negotiations on new accessions to the WTO.
A.

DEVELOPING CONSENSUS

ON

GOALS

We have worked to build the largest possible degree of consensus on our goals in agriculture. We have been focusing on
the substantive problems with implementation and our goals for
further reform. We called for building upon the basic structure
of the Uruguay Round disciplines on agriculture - market access, domestic supports and export subsidies - and our trading
partners seem to accept this fundamental approach for new
negotiations.
We want to work closely with Congress and the private sector to determine the best way to mold the various measures affecting agricultural trade into detailed negotiating plans. The
advice from the International Trade Commission will be useful
to help us test possible approaches and build consensus for new
initiatives. For example, we have already been approached
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about sectoral initiatives in some areas and other approaches.
We need to continue to work to refine the elements of our negotiating plans to meet these objectives.
In addition to our work at the WTO in Geneva, we have
used the opportunities created by our regional trade initiatives
and major international meetings (e.g. the US-Africa Ministerial
in Washington this March; the NAFTA Ministerial in Ottawa in
April; Free Trade Area of the Americas conferences; the US-EU
Summit this spring; the Quad meeting in Tokyo; the OECD Ministerial; Cairns Group meetings; and most recently the APEC
meeting in New Zealand in September) to build support for our
goals in market access, subsidies and biotechnology. Some examples include:
* Asia-Pacific - At the APEC Ministerial this fall, we won a
commitment by all 23 APEC Trade Ministers, including
those of Japan, Canada, Mexico, the ASEAN states, South
Korea and others, to take a joint stand for the "abolition of
agricultural export subsidies," and to promote "transparent
and science-based approaches to the introduction and use of
biotechnology products."
" Africa - This March, we hosted an historic US-Africa Ministerial, at which we found common ground with many African
trading partners on agricultural market access issues. Likewise, we have support from a number of African countries on
elimination of export subsidies - which are especially damaging to developing country farmers.
* Europe - Clearly, many of our most difficult negotiating
challenges in agriculture will be with the European Union.
However, we are working to develop consensus in as many
areas as possible. Under the Transatlantic Economic Partnership discussions, we opened a pilot project to enhance
transparency and access to regulatory procedures, under
which we will strive to agree on common data requirements
for the acceptance of biotechnology products.
* Western Hemisphere - We are working towards commitment from every Western Hemisphere nation participating
in the FTAA talks (with the exception of Cuba) to work for
elimination of export subsidies globally, and have developed
wide support for this goal.
B.

WTO AcCESSIONS

Finally, thirty-one economies are now applying for accession
to the WTO. In each of these we are requiring full compliance

2000]

AGRICULTURAL

TRADE AGEvDA

with the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture as well as
significant market-opening measures, immediate acceptance of
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, and improved
transparency in any existing state trading arrangements.
Specifically, in the past year we have brought Kyrgyzstan
and Latvia into the WTO; completed negotiations with Estonia,
with accession pending its Parliamentary ratification of the accession agreements; completed bilateral negotiations with Taiwan, Georgia and Albania; and made significant progress with
Armenia, China, Croatia, Jordan, Lithuania, Moldova and
Oman.
In the case of China, which is of course the largest prospective new economy in the WTO, while some services and rules
issues remain for discussion, agricultural negotiations are complete and include a very strong set of commitments in market
access, renunciation of export subsidies, tariff-rate quotas and
other issues. These negotiations resumed at the direction of
Presidents Clinton and Jiang at the APEC Leaders Meeting in
September.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have developed a set of negotiating objectives which reflect the advice and priorities we have received
from Congress and American agricultural producers; set precedents on our objectives in our accession negotiations, and begun
to build the international coalitions that will realize our goals in
agricultural negotiations. Much work remains ahead. We look
forward to negotiating results which lead to a fairer, more open
trading world for America's farm and ranch families.

